By Luke Lischin
“The peace table is now wide open for everybody,” declared
Presidential Peace Adviser Jesus Dureza to mark the National Peace
Consciousness Month in the Philippines.
“This table is not only for the Muslims, for the New People’s Army,
for the indigenous peoples, but for all Filipinos,” he added.
While Dureza reserves their seat, the New People’s Army (NPA) shows
no signs of returning to the table. Rejecting President Rodrigo
Duterte’s call for localised talks, the NPA remains a growing threat to
national security, especially in Mindanao.
As of June 2018, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) estimates
the presence of approximately 3,900 NPA rebels nationwide. The Eastern
Mindanao Command reports 50% of the NPA’s strength resides in within its
area of operations. Whereas the AFP is confident in its ability to
degrade and inevitably defeat the NPA, the level of NPA violence in
Mindanao has increased since the election of Duterte.
Of the 1,103 incidents recorded from January 2017 to July 2018 in the
Political Violence in the Southern Philippines Dataset, the NPA was
involved in 425 or just over one quarter of all incidents. This dataset
is based on the coding of open source-materials including periodicals,
official press releases, and academic/humanitarian reporting on episodes
of political violence occurring within the administrative boundaries of
Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago.
NPA violence dogged the final months of Benigno Aquino III’s
presidency before giving way to a “honeymoon period” after Duterte’s
election, which led to a formal ceasefire agreement in August 2016. The
ceasefire effectively reduced violence to negligible levels, but could
not produce lasting peace in the absence of a negotiated political
settlement. With the breakdown of negotiations and tensions in the
field, the NPA formally ended the ceasefire on 30 January 2017 with a
heightened series of offensives through April 2017. After dropping off
in April 2017, the number of NPA incidents picked up again from May
through September 2017 when Duterte declared Martial Law in Mindanao due
to the Siege of Marawi. This explicitly motivated the NPA to escalate
its operations, which in turn led the Duterte administration to cancel
the anticipated fifth round of peace talks.
During the initial Martial Law period, attacks against security
forces including the AFP, police, and government militias averaged 16
incidents per month. Although there were 16 incidents overall in October
2017, only 7 were attacks on security forces, while the rest were
attacks on civilian and commercial targets. This trend suggests that the
NPA shifted to “soft” targets as the AFP was able to dedicate more
assets away from Marawi. This shift was short-lived, however, as from
November 2017 to July 2018 security forces endured 12 attacks on average
per month.
Across all incidents the NPA was responsible for killing 168
soldiers, police officers, and civilians, while wounding an additional
266. Casualties on the side of security forces peaked at 67 in July
2017, when a short series of ambushes in Bukidnon and Compostela Valley
resulted in relatively heavy losses for the AFP. By August 2017 through
March 2018 casualties averaged 10 per month, and then increased to 16
casualties per month from April 2018 to July 2018, showing a clear
increase in the intensity as well as the frequency of NPA incidents.
Meanwhile the NPA sustained 185 fatalities and 109 injuries within
their own ranks. 20% of the fatalities and almost 25% of the casualties
were sustained during the March 2017 post-ceasefire hostilities. This
marks the single biggest period of losses for the group. Otherwise, NPA
fatalities and injuries remained low in total but persistent over time,
averaging about 3 fatalities and 7 injuries per month. Perhaps
unsurprisingly, the casualties sustained by the NPA as well as the
surrenders of rebels flaunted by the government have not visibly reduced
levels of NPA violence over time.
Fluctuations in the numbers of NPA incidents were also observed
geographically. From January 2016 to July 2018, 23 provinces in the
Southern Philippines experienced NPA incidents, during which time only
Compostela Valley (48), Agusan del Norte (44), Bukidnon (44), Cotabato
(44), and Davao del Sur (43) experienced more than 40 incidents,
accounting for roughly 61% of total injuries and 50% of total fatalities
on all sides.
Of these provinces, Cotabato transformed from one of the least
violent provinces in all of Mindanao in 2016, to the most violent in
2017. Unlike NPA incidents in Compostela Valley, Bukidnon, and Davao del
Sur, the overwhelming majority of NPA violence in Cotabato consisted of
armed assaults against security forces where the NPA was on the
offensive. In Agusan del Norte security forces also experienced
relatively high levels of NPA attacks, especially in 2017, but these did
not escalate as dramatically those in Cotabato.
Beyond just Cotabato and Agusan del Norte, the NPA overwhelmingly
favoured security forces as their target. Although the military often
dismisses the NPA as bandits, 74% of all NPA incidents engaged state
security forces. Only 13% of NPA incidents targeted obvious commercial
sites, such as company vehicles, plantations, mines, and offices. Over
40% of incidents directed at commercial targets occurred in the
provinces of Bukidnon, Davao del Sur, and Agusan del Norte. Lumads,
politicians, regular civilians, and other miscellaneous targets were
victimised in the remaining 16% of incidents. Some of these incidents
may have also entailed financial motivations, but the abduction, injury,
or murder of these persons were undoubtedly politically motivated.
With 5 months yet to be coded in the dataset, 2018 has already
surpassed 2016 in terms of the average number of incidents and
casualties per month. It is likely that it will match or even surpass
2017 by the same measures. As NPA violence grows worse, it becomes
difficult to envision a return to the negotiating table given the lack
of effective military solutions or political incentives. In the
meantime, the Duterte administration and analysts like Rommel Banlaoi
insist Martial Law will keep violence from the NPA and other groups
under control, but so far this blank-cheque approach to
counterinsurgency has yet to pay real dividends.
Alternatively, localised peace talks and greater regional autonomy
via federalism are non-military solutions promoted by the Duterte
administration. The prospect of devolved governance has achieved
preliminary but positive results in Mindanao with the Bangsamoro Organic
Law, and may hold promise for other conflict-affected regions,
including proposed Autonomous Region for the Cordillera.
Nevertheless, the NPA considers localised talks to be “a classic
divide and rule tactic” and is equally suspicious of federalism, making
the path to peace through governance an uphill battle no matter how it
is waged.
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